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Summary:
The traditional theoretical presentation of the model of Soviet
rapid industrialization has been based upon the debate between
Preobrazhenski, the super Indus trializer, and Bukharin, the advocate
of balanced growth of agriculture and industry. The debate purportedly
culminated in a dilemma which was resolved by Stalin with the decision
to collectivize Soviet agriculture. This model, which was formulated
by A. Erlich (Erlich, 1950) and is still common in our textbooks, has
been seriously questioned recently on both theoretical and empirical
grounds.
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The traditional theoretical presentation of the model of Soviet
rapid industrialization has been based upon the debate between
Preobrazhenski, the super industrializer, and Bukharin, the advocate
of balanced growth of agriculture and industry. The debate purportedly
culminated in a dilemma which was resolved by Stalin with the decision
to collectivize Soviet agriculture. This model, which was formulated
by A. Erlich (Erlich, 1950) and is still common in our textbooks, has
been seriously questioned recently on both theoretical and empirical
grounds (Millar, 1970a, 1970b, 1974, 1976; Ellman, 1975).
It now seems, for example, that Bukharin was wrong in asserting
that the peasantry would withdraw from the market in response to an
adverse change in their terms of trade (Millar, 1970a; Guntzel, 1972)
thereby undermining Preobrazhenski' s proposed industrialization drive.
Preobrazhenski' s proposals to tax the peasantry as a primary way to
finance industrialization might very well have worked so long as the
method used would change the terms of trade for agriculture taken as
a whole and not merely relative agricultural prices. Interestingly
enough, however, the empirical evidence from the period of the First
Five-Year Plan shows that Preobrazhenski was wrong in thinking that
"exploitation" of the rural sector was a necessary condition for rapid
industrial growth. We now know that the terms of trade did not change
adversely for agriculture and that the net surplus of agriculture
during the First Five-Year Plan cannot explain the enormous increase
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in the rate and absolute quantity of accumulation, although there is
a certain ambiguity about just how much agriculture did contribute
before and after collectivization (Millar, 1974 and Ellman, 1975).
Consequently, the dilemma that Alexander Erlich identified was not
really a dilemma at all, and thus the appropriateness of collectivi-
zation as a "solution" must also be in doubt. I have argued that it
was purely and simply a mistake, but Michael Ellman apparently does
not agree.
Ellman and I both agree that the empirical data available for the
First Five-Year Plan does not support Alexander Erlich' s interpreta-
tion. Consequently, the question is now: What model(s) do fit best
the actual process of early Soviet rapid development? It is on this
head that Ellman and I differ, and differ substantially. As best I can
tell, Ellman subscribes to what I shall call a modified Preobrazhenski
model of primitive accumulation (Millar, 1977). Ellman also concludes
that collectivization played a positive role in the process of Soviet
rapid development, although this role is not the same as that suggested
by A. Erlich, Alec Nove and other bearers of the standard story.
Let me first attempt to specify Michael Ellman' s conception of
the model of Soviet economic growth during the First Five-Year Plan.
Ellman agrees that, no matter how you measure it, "collectivization
did not increase the net agricultural surplus (measured in 1913 world
market prices, 1928 Soviet prices or Marxist values)..." (Ellman, 1975,
p. 859). I have argued in favor of the 1928 price weight measure of
the net surplus of agriculture, but Ellman argues Instead for some type
of "Marxist" weights. The latter represent weighting of intersector
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flows by input prices, on the assumption that labor is the only input.
He also assumes that relative prices of industrial and agricultural
products in 1928 in the Soviet Union did not reflect the true labor-
content ratios and must therefore be adjusted. The adjustment increases
the relative weight of agricultural products in intersector flows and
therefore produces a net outflow of resources to Industry during the
First Five-Year Plan, as opposed to the net inflow of resources from
nonagriculture that one obtains by using constant 1928 prices weights.
Regardless of which weights one uses, collectivization did not
lead to an increased (algebraically) net surplus of agriculture, and
thus Ellman and I agree on this point. However, the difference in the
sign of the net flow between agriculture and nonagriculture represents
a real difference also in the way that the role of agriculture in econo-
mic development is conceived in a model of Soviet experience. Ellman'
s
analysis lends partial support to the Preobrazhenski model (Ellman,
1975, note 2, p. 860). Where Preobrazhenski called for "exploitation"
of the rural sector by the state and "self-exploitation" by the indus-
trial workers, as two sources of accumulation, only the second part
came true judging by the empirical evidence. That is, following Ellman,
contrary to the standard story which assumed that workers in the agri-
cultural sector would be exploited for development of the industrial
sector
,
it turns out that it was the exploitation of workers trans-
ferred to industry from agriculture that explains Soviet accumulation.
Therefore, in Ellman' s view, primitive socialist accumulation took
place in the industrial sector, and the contribution of agriculture
was primarily in contributing manpower to the industrial sector. In
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addition, according to Ellman, agriculture contributed an "increased
supply of basic wage goods" and it "provided substantial exports" as
well.
More important with respect to the standard story and its view of
collectivization as an effective instrument in support of rapid indus-
trialization, Ellman ultimately attributes these contributions of
agriculture to collectivization. That is, he states that during the
First Five-Year Plan "collectivization appears as a process which
enabled the state to increase its inflow of grain, potatoes and vege-
tables and its stock of urban labour, at the expense of livestock and
the rural and urban human population" (Ellman, 1975, p. 859). He goes
on to say that the "two key mechanisms for obtaining the additional
investment resources were collectivization (which made possible the
increase in the volume of basic wage goods marketed by agriculture and
the increase in the urban labour force) and the rapid inflation (which
facilitated the fall in urban real wages)" (Ellman, 1975, p. 860).
Thus, Ellman sees in the policy of collectivization not simply a mis-
take, but positive attributes, and I must admit that I find this
puzzling.
The increased flow of grain and potatoes was, as Ellman, admits,
at the expense of livestock herds and thus livestock products. Most
students of the late 1920s argue that the growth of livestock herds
was being encouraged by the improving relative price of livestock pro-
duct prices—caused partly by government restraints on bread and grain
prices. Even if it can be shown to have been necessary to change the
composition of the population's diet back to a larger share of starches.
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as a prerequisite of rapid industrialization, why could this not have
been done just as effectively and with much less waste and suffering
by simply changing relative prices to favor grains and potatoes? There
is plenty of evidence to show that Soviet peasant fanners were highly
sensitive to relative prices of farm output.
Ellman claims that collectivization was necessary to generate an
adequate off-farm flow of labor, but he offers no evidence in support
of the claim other than merely to assert that a large flow was required
in the face of falling urban real wages. Obviously, part of the
required labor was found among the urban unemployed, but the remainder
had to be "mobilized" elsewhere. The first point to note is that no
successfully developing country has experienced difficulty in generating
a rural- to-urban flow of labor, and in most cases problems have been
posed instead by excessive outmigration from rural areas. In addition,
the fall in urban-industrial real wages was attributable in large part
to the devastation of agricultural production occasioned by collectivi-
zation itself. The inflation that was caused in part by this reduction
in available food supplies certainly did the Soviet state no good. The
state budget may benefit from an inflation that turns the terms of trade
in its favor, but it does not stand to benefit from an inflation caused
by a decrease in available food supplies and changes the terms of trade
in favor of farmers at the expense of urban workers. This is what col-
lectivization accomplished. In short, the burden would seem to be on
Ellman to show why a differentially favorable wage would not have been
both adequate and more desirable as a means to generate a suitable flow
of outmigration from rural areas.
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There is another issue that needs to be raised in connection with
the transfer of labor from rural to urban-industrial occupations.
Where the additional labor employed in new industrial occupations was
either not employed previously in agriculture or was employed where it
had a zero marginal product, it is not clear at all to which sector
the "contribution" ought to be attributed. Do we credit agriculture,
despite the fact that neither outputs nor inputs are affected? Or do
we credit the sector that puts these idle resources to work with the
contribution to growth? This is another example of the inescapable
element of ambiguity that attaches to any attempt to identify contri-
butions of components of any interdependent system.
Collectivization did indeed help to drive people out of rural
occupations, nonagricultural as well as agricultural. And it cer-
tainly contributed to the decline in real wages in both sectors, which
in turn helped to drive previously unemployed wives, children and
elders plus the underemployed into industrial occupations with the
goal of maintaining real per capita (or family) income. The point is,
however, that there were many other alternative ways of accomplishing
these ends, and the cost to the human population would have been much
less for almost any of the alternatives.
The Lewis labor surplus model of the development process has had
a large impact on the theory of economic development. Although Lewis's
own statements about the process in the Soviet Union are now clearly
seen to have been incorrect— for he relied on a version of what I have
called the standard paradigm, his model is still useful in looking at
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the Soviet experience as we see it today. Unfortunately, Lewis's mis-
understanding of the Soviet growth experience has had a large impact
on the profession, and his now famous articles (Lewis, 1954, 1958) un-
doubtedly contributed mightily, along with Erlich's, to the creation
and propagation of the standard story of industrialization at the
' expense of the agriculture in the USSR.
According to Lewis, what needs to be explained in any model of
economic development is how the saving rate gets raised. His main
contention is that the increase in the rate of saving out of national
income has ordinarily been the result not of changing everyone's rate
of saving, but by changing the distribution of income in such a way
that "the incomes of the savers increase relatively to the national
income. The central fact of economic development is that the distri-
bution of incomes is altered in favor of the saving class" (Lewis,
1954, pp. 156-57). The First Five-Year Plan certainly raised the rate
of saving in the USSR— from 14.8% of national income in 1928 to 44.1%
in 1932 according to Ellman's presentation (1975, p. 845, Table 1).
However, where Lewis was concerned with shifting income among private
recipients to those who save more— the capitalists, in the Soviet case
the shift was from the private to the public sector.
There are then certain immediately obvious similarities between an
analysis based on the Lewis model and one based on Preobrazhenski' s.
The similarities derive from the fact that Lewis's model is a "classi-
cal" rather than a neoclassical model of development. If modified to
fit the Soviet experience (and purged of certain rather bizarre discus-
sions of inflationary financing) Lewis's model would appear to fit the
i:3at»l »o.
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Soviet experience better than Preobrazhenski' s. The notion is that the
typical developing country has unlimited supplies of labor in the short
run, making it possible to increase both output and accumulation by
putting idle labor to work. Since supplies of labor are unlimited,
increasing employment does not raise the real wage in the growth sec-
tors. Consequently, those initiating employment (in this case the
state), stand to reap a disproportionate share of claims on the addi-
tional output—-claims that could be utilized to increase the rate of
saving and thus of capital accumulation.
The Lewis model does not require a decline in real wages for this
to happen, merely a noticeable gap between rural and urban employments.
Since collectivization did not lead to an adverse change in the terms
of trade for agricultural producers, Lewis would certainly not see it
as a potentially useful device. In fact, because it caused a decline
in the capital stock in agriculture and thus increased labor demand in
that sector, collectivization could not possibly be a prescription of
the Lewis model.
The problem with the Lewis model, however, is the same as for any
model that bases growth upon a surplus of some sort: growth must be
explained by increases in the surplus (as Ellman seeks to do in his
analysis of the Barsov data) . In the case of a labor surplus (as
opposed to surplus value or product) , eventually the surplus will be
absorbed, and, when it is, growth must come to depend upon different
factors altogether. The Ranis and Fei (1961) model is a good example
of this, for somewhere between stage one and stage two their model is
converted from a "classical" model that depends upon absorbing surplus
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labor, into a "neoclassical" model in which growth depends upon
increases in "total factor productivity" in both the agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors.
Lewis attempted to provide a rationale for the necessity to
change models in midstream growth by asserting that the nature of
the development process itself changes with the process of successful
development. Thus the early stages of growth can be explained only by
a classical model, and later stages are amenable only to neoclassical
analysis. To my mind this has an advantage over a Marxist model, such
as Preobrazhenski' s , because it is much more awkward to force neoclas-
sical considerations into the Marxist model than it is merely to switch
models. To some extent, also, the gradual shifting emphasis in the
Soviet economy over time from growth dependent exclusively upon growth
of input quantities to growth based upon increases in total factor
productivity does seem to illustrate Lewis's point of view.
The Lewis model is not really necessary however. It is possible
to conceive of growth within a modern analytic framework (Ellman calls
this a "Keynesian point of view" p. 860) as having three components.
Consider a typical production frontier. Growth can be quite rapid if
actual output is within the frontier by merely increasing demand for
output. Second, by changing the conventional definition of "full
employment" (of both population and capital), as in wartime or by some
similar social transformation, the frontier may shift substantially
overnight. These two components of growth correspond to Lewis's labor
surplus stage. Subsequently, growth will depend, given the saving rate.
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upon two factors: the growth of inputs in physical terms and the
increase in total factor productivity. Within this framework, Soviet
collectivization could find an economic rationale only as a process
necessary to the social transformation stage. Ellman apparently
believes that this was the case (as did Erlich before him) , but this
needs to be established. Collectivization had so severe a negative
impact upon the growth of agricultural output, upon the capital stock,
(and thus the demand for labor in agriculture) , and upon the long run
capacity of the Soviet agricultural sector to achieve efficiency and
increases in productivity, that the burden would seem to be on Ellman
to show why it was necessary.
I proposed a way of looking at the role of agriculture in my 1970
article in Soviet Studies . I do not refer here to my formula for ascer-
taining the net contribution of agriculture (i.e., the net contribution
of agriculture to net investment in the economy as a whole). What I
described were several alternative ways that are useful in thinking
about the contribution of a sector of an economy to growth when it is
fully agreed at the outset that no unambiguous measure is possible for
a component sector of an interdependent system (Millar, 1970b, pp. 87-
92). Agriculture participates in growth if its output grows, and it
participates in development if total factor productivity grows also,
or if worker productivity grows thanks to the substitution of capital
for labor. It is clear that Soviet agriculture participated in neither
growth nor development during the First Five-Year Plan.
It has generally been assumed that Soviet agriculture failed to
participate in growth and development because its contributions to
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other sectors were so great. However, we have seen that the net pro-
duct contribution of Soviet agriculture was either negative (using
1928 weights), or positive but unaugmented (using 1913 world market,
or "Marxist" price weights). The market contribution (which is the
extent to which a sector's purchases from other sectors help to finance
those other sector' s own purchases of products) of Soviet agriculture
was clearly negligible or negative during the First Five-Year Plan, and
the same is true of the finance contribution of agriculture. The truth
is, then, that by any measure, Soviet agriculture proved a dead weight
on growth of the Soviet economy, and this was so, I propose, because
collectivization was a massive policy error. It was a mistake from
which no one stood to gain, including the state.
The "contributions" that Ellman seeks to attribute to collectivi-
zation belong instead to the introduction of the predatory agricultural
procurement system^—which helped to limit the losses collectivization
brought about and thus raised the share of marketed output in the face
of a decline in total output. While it is undoubtedly true that
staunching the flow of blood from a severed artery is a "contribution"
to health of the patient, the wound itself is not. Collectivization
and the Stalinist agricultural procurement system of the 1930s stand
in an analogous relation to one another. Taken together, there was no
net contribution to economic growth.
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